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FOURTH CIRCUIT FUMBLES THE BALL: SPIRIT
OF DISABILITY RIGHTS COMPROMISED IN THE
WAKE OF CLASS V. TOWSON UNIVERSITY
Dave Peterson*
The Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in Class v. Towson University
threatens the rights guaranteed to disabled persons under the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(“Rehab Act”). The Acts demand that disabled persons not be excluded
from activities based on unsubstantiated paternalistic concerns, and, where
exclusion occurs, the Acts entrust courts to evaluate whether exclusion was
warranted in light of the best available objective evidence. This Comment
argues that by deferring to the speculative fears and subjective judgment of
Towson University—the very entity accused of violating the ADA and
Rehab Act in Class v. Towson—the Fourth Circuit abandoned its duties and
rendered an improper decision.
This Comment begins with a critique of the Fourth Circuit’s
reasoning in Class v. Towson and demonstrates that the factual record was
devoid of evidence supporting the court’s decision to exclude Gavin
Class—a disabled athlete—from Towson’s football team. This Comment
continues by arguing that the Fourth Circuit employed an incorrect
standard of analysis when determining that Class’s disqualification did not
violate the ADA or Rehab Act. The conclusion of this Comment implores
the legal community to reject the Fourth Circuit’s holding and reaffirm
disabled persons’ right to live free from paternalistic authorities.

* J.D. Candidate at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 2018. The author would like to
thank Professor Daniel Martin and the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review
editorial staff for their assistance with this article. He also wishes to express his appreciation to
Gavin Class, an offensive lineman whose grit is in keeping with the tradition of that most
important position.
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INTRODUCTION

This Comment addresses the plight of Gavin Class (“Class”), a
Division I college football player who was excluded from National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) competition following an incident
that left him disabled. 1 The issue is whether Towson University
(“Towson”) violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehab Act”) and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) when it prevented Class
from returning to the football field. 2 The District Court for the District of
Maryland found for Class, but the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
in favor of Towson. 3 This Comment asserts that the Fourth Circuit applied
flawed reasoning and reached an incorrect decision. 4 In finding that
Towson was justified in excluding Class, the Court deferred to the
“subjective good faith” judgment of Towson’s physicians rather than
independently analyzing the facts to determine whether the university’s
action was substantially justified and “objectively reasonable.” 5 In doing
so, the Court discounted considerable medical evidence favoring Class’
return and undercut the spirit of the ADA and the Rehab Act, while also
making it impossible for disabled athletes to challenge paternalistic
decisions denying them the right of inclusion. 6
Part II of this Comment begins with an examination of Class v.
Towson, where the factual narrative is explored. Part III then discusses the
nature of a discrimination action brought under the ADA and Rehab Act.
Part IV shows that Class should have prevailed in his claim against
Towson. Finally, Part V concludes by summarizing the Fourth Circuit’s

1. See Class v. Towson Univ., 806 F.3d 236 (4th Cir. 2015).
2. Id. at 239.
3. Class v. Towson Univ., 118 F. Supp. 3d 833, 837 (D. Md. 2015), rev’d, Class 806 F.3d
236; Class, 806 F.3d at 239.
4. See Eldon L. Ham, How 4th Circ. Failed to Clarify Athlete Disability Rights, LAW 360
(Jan. 3, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/738601/how-4th-circ-failed-to-clarifyathlete-disability-rights [https://perma.cc/FEZ4-8SMJ].
5. Class, 806 F.3d at 257 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 253–59 (Wynn, J., dissenting); see also Peter M. Spingola, Knapp v.
Northwestern University: The Seventh Circuit Slam Dunks the Rights of the Disabled, 73 CHI.KENT L. REV 709, 730 (1998).
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errors and recommending how the judiciary should resolve similar cases in
the future.
II.

BACKGROUND

Gavin Class, a starting offensive lineman for the Division I Towson
University Tigers football team, collapsed due to exertional heatstroke
during a team practice in August 2013. 7 The heatstroke pushed Class to the
brink of death: he was in a coma for nine days, suffered multi-organ
failure, received chemotherapy, and required a liver transplant amongst
numerous additional procedures. 8
Facing an arduous recovery, Class set out to be the first liver
transplant recipient to play Division I college football. 9 He told ESPN
reporters, “I don’t want to give up. I’m doing this to send a message and
be an inspiration.”10 As a testament to his determination, Class resumed
training with Towson’s strength coach in October 2014. At that time, the
university also enlisted the advisory services of specialists at the Korey
Stringer Institute (the “Institute”)—the nation’s leading research center
studying heatstroke and heat illness. 11 After conducting a conditioning test
in February 2015, specialists at the Institute concluded that Class was fit to
practice in mild weather, provided that he took appropriate precautions. 12
Despite this conclusion, Towson’s Head Team Physician, Dr. Kari
Kindschi, prohibited Class’ return because she felt that he could not safely
return to practice or game play.13 Notably, despite being an accomplished,
board-certified sports medicine practitioner, Kindschi had no expertise in
heatstroke or heat-related illnesses,14 and her decision to block Class’
7. Class v. Towson Univ., 806 F.3d 236, 238 (4th Cir. 2015).
8. Id. at 239.
9. ESPN Edit Operations, Outside the Lines: Gavin Class, VIMEO (2015),
https://vimeo.com/141587564 [http://perma.cc/N7TC-SLGV]; see Class 806 F.3d at 239, 252.
10. ESPN Edit Operations, supra note 9.
11. Class v. Towson Univ., 118 F. Supp. 3d 833, 838–39 (D. Md.), rev’d, Class, 806 F.3d
236.
12. Class, 806 F.3d at 240.
13. Id.
14. See Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 836.
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return was based solely on the speculative fear that he would suffer repeat
heatstroke.15
Nevertheless, according to Towson’s “Return-to-Play
Policy,” Kindschi had the final word in determining whether a sidelined
student-athlete could return to competition. 16 Unsatisfied with this result,
Class petitioned the federal district court for an injunction allowing him to
fully participate in the university’s football program, alleging that
Towson’s decision violated the ADA and the Rehab Act. 17
In June 2015, while awaiting the court’s decision, the Institute put
Class through a rigorous fitness test in conditions that mimicked a
summertime football practice. 18 According to the Institute’s Chief
Operating Officer, Dr. Douglas Casa,19 Class’ results were “stellar” and
overall Class did “exceptionally well” in demonstrating his ability to
properly thermoregulate. 20 Consequently, Casa, in concert with Dr.
William Hutson21 and Dr. Rolf Barth, 22 co-directors of liver transplantation
at the University of Maryland Medical Center, concluded that there was

15. ESPN Edit Operations, supra note 9 (“[She was] afraid that he would suffer another
heatstroke, but [she] had no proof. She was basing her decision on fear. That was her exact
words ‘I’m basing my decision on fear.’”); see Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 842.
16. Class, 806 F.3d at 241.
17. Id. at 242.
18. Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 840.
19. Transcript of Record at 81–86, Class, 806 F.3d 236 (No. 1:15-cv-01544-RDB) (Dr.
Casa’s qualifications include having treated 185 exertional heatstrokes, authored over 175 peerreviewed publications and two books related to heat and hydration issues in sports, and having
served as a “heat consultant” for the National Football League, United States military, and
professional soccer organizations. Dr. Casa has also conducted over forty field research studies
and sixty lab research studies related to heatstroke and heat illness and is a Fellow of the
American College of Sports Medicine and the National Athletic Trainers’ Association (NATA).
In 2008, he was recognized as the “Outstanding Researcher” by the Profession of Athletic
Training); see also Brief of Appellee at 53, Class, 806 F.3d 236 (No. 1:15-cv-01544-RDB) (In
2013, NATA recognized Dr. Casa as its “Most Distinguished Athletic Trainer”).
20. Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 840; ESPN Edit Operations, supra note 9.
21. Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 838 (Dr. Hutson was Class’ primary physician and codirector of liver transplantation at The University of Maryland Medical Center at The University
of Maryland Medical Center); Transcript of Record, supra note 19, at 9.
22. ESPN Edit Operations, supra note 9 (Dr. Bath was co-director of liver transplantation
at the University of Maryland Medical Center).
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absolutely no reason why Class should not be on the field. 23 The sole
caveat to Class’ return was that Towson must monitor him as directed by
the Institute and the University of Maryland’s transplant team. 24 This
included having an on-site team trainer track Class’ internal temperature
during football activities through use of the CorTemp system. 25 To use
CorTemp, Class had to “ingest a small electronic device that would track
his internal body temperature and communicate the readings through lowfrequency radio waves to a nearby handheld monitor.”26 Dr. Casa
recommended that a team trainer take readings from the monitor by
positioning himself or herself behind Class for three to five seconds every
five to ten minutes during football activities. 27 By executing this plan,
Towson “could [e]nsure that Class could cease activity before he reached a
level where he was in danger of a reoccurrence of heatstroke or heat
illness.” 28
Still, despite the Institute having medically cleared Class, Kindschi
held fast to her belief that allowing Class to return to the field would
threaten his safety. 29 Thus, she continued to deny him reinstatement. 30
Kindschi also claimed that implementing CorTemp was an unreasonable
accommodation because it required team trainers to operate beyond the
scope of their jobs,31 even though Class offered to absolve Towson of any
and all liability. 32 Speaking for Towson, Kindschi reasoned that Class was

23. Id.
24. Id.; see Transcript of Record, supra note 19, at 19–22.
25. Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 841–42.
26. Class, 806 F.3d at 243.
27. Class, 806 F.3d at 243; Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 841.
28. Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 840–41.
29. See id. at 842.
30. See id.
31. Id. at 843.
32. Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 844 n.8 (“Nor is there any risk of increased liability for the
University because Class has indicated that he is willing to sign a waiver before participating.”);
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 21, Class, 806 F.3d 236 (No.
1:15-cv-01544-RDB) (“Gavin has made clear to Towson that he is willing to sign a binding
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not “otherwise qualified” to play football, and thus the university’s decision
to exclude him from the team did not violate the ADA or the Rehab Act. 33
Following a one-day bench trial in which the medical evidence was
considered, the district court rejected Towson’s argument and issued an
injunction that prevented the university from excluding Class from
competition.34 The court found that Class’ proposed accommodations,
namely CorTemp, were reasonable and would allow him to safely return to
competition.35 Unhappy with this result, Towson appealed to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court in a two-to-one
panel decision.36 The Fourth Circuit’s majority opinion noted that courts
were “particularly ill-equipped” 37 to evaluate a patient’s medical history,
positing that the court’s job was not to “agree or disagree with Dr.
Kindschi’s opinion or to weigh whether her evaluation [was] more
persuasive than [the Institute’s].”38 Instead, the majority held that courts
should defer to a university’s decision to exclude a disabled athlete where
the decision was reached in good faith and in accordance with the
university’s internal policies.39 Because Towson satisfied these criteria, the
Fourth Circuit held that the university could rightfully prevent Class’ return
to the football field. 40

waiver of any liability on behalf of Towson in the event that he suffers another heat stroke or
related medical issues while participating in the Towson football program.”).
33. See Class, 806 F.3d at 243.
34. Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 851.
35. Id. at 848; Jonathan R. Mook, Circuit Courts Address Who Is “Qualified” under the
ADA, 2016 LAB. & EMP. EMERGING ISSUES 7426 (May 12, 2016); see Transcript of Record,
supra note 19, at 20–21 (other non-contested accommodations included a Kevlar pad to protect
Class’ liver and a continued regimen of immunosuppressive medications).
36. Mook, supra note 35.
37. Class, 806 F.3d at 251 (quoting Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horwitz, 435
U.S. 78, 92 (1978)).
38. Id. at 249.
39. See id. at 247–49.
40. Id. at 251.
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EXAMINATION OF APPLICABLE LAW
Purposes of the Rehab Act and the ADA

In seeking an injunction against Towson, Class alleged that the
school’s decision to exclude him from the football program amounted to a
violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 41 Although these Acts apply to
different entities, their purposes are identical, and plaintiffs frequently
invoke them together.42 By enacting the Rehab Act, Congress sought to
ensure that a person’s disability “in no way diminishes [that person’s] right
to . . . enjoy self-determination; make choices; . . . and enjoy full inclusion
and integration in the . . . social . . . [and] cultural . . . mainstream . . . .”43
Similarly, the ADA was enacted seventeen years later “to [further] provide
a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities . . . .” 44 Taken together,
both Acts “require[] that remote or minimal risk [to a disabled person’s
safety] not be used to legitimize discrimination [i.e., exclusion from certain
activities].”45 They also “prohibit[] authorities from deciding without
significant medical support that certain activities are too risky for a
disabled person [because] [d]ecisions of this sort cannot rest on
paternalistic concerns.” 46
41. Class v. Towson Univ., 806 F.3d 236, 251 (4th Cir. 2015).
42. See Matthew J. Mitten, Enhanced Risk of Harm to One’s Self as a Justification for
Exclusion from Athletics, 8 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 189, 194 (1998) (citations omitted) (“A claim
[under the ADA] requires proof of essentially the same elements as a Rehabilitation Act claim
except that, instead of showing that the defendant receives federal funds, the athlete must prove
that the defendant is covered by the ADA’s ‘public entity’ or ‘public accommodation’
provisions.”).
43. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)(3).
44. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
45. Knapp v. Nw. Univ., 942 F. Supp. 1191, 1197 (N.D. Ill.), rev’d, Knapp v. Nw. Univ.,
101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996); accord 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
46. Knapp 101 F.3d at 485–86; see Maureen A. Weston, The Intersection of Sports and
Disability: Analyzing Reasonable Accommodations for Athletes with Disabilities, 50 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 137, 163 (2005) (“The federal disability laws provide athletes with disabilities a vital
mechanism to ensure that decisions regarding their rights to participate in athletics are
thoughtfully considered, medically justified, and not disregarded simply upon notions of undue
administrative burdens, false notions of competitive advantage, or paternalism.”).
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Elements of a Discrimination Action Brought Under the
ADA or Rehab Act

To prevail on [a] claim for discrimination under the Rehab Act
[and the ADA], [a plaintiff] must prove that: (1) he [or she] is
disabled as defined by the [Acts]; (2) he [or she] is otherwise
qualified for the position sought; (3) he [or she] has been
excluded from the position solely because of his or her
disability; and (4) the position exists as part of a program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance. 47
In considering the first element, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the
district court’s finding that complications from Class’ heatstroke rendered
him disabled under the Acts. 48 The court also held that the third and fourth
elements were satisfied because Towson was a public university and
openly admitted to excluding Class from its football team solely because of
his disability.49 That left only the second element at issue: Was Gavin
Class “otherwise qualified” to return to the field as a member of the
Towson Tigers football team?50
1. Defining What It Means to Be “Otherwise Qualified”
A disabled person is otherwise qualified for a position if that person,
with or without reasonable accommodations, can perform the essential
functions of, and/or meet the essential eligibility requirements for that
position.51 An accommodation is reasonable unless: (1) it would impose
undue financial or administrative burdens on the program or entity
sponsoring the position; (2) implementation would fundamentally alter the

47. Knapp, 101 F.3d at 478; accord Class v. Towson Univ., 118 F. Supp. 3d 833, 845 (D.
Md.), rev’d, Class v. Towson Univ., 806 F.3d 236 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that under the ADA (4)
the position exists as part of a program or activity sponsored by a public entity).
48. Class 118 F. Supp. 3d at 846; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (Under the ADA, “[t]he
definition of ‘disability’ . . . shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals . . . . An
impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major
life activity when active.”).
49. See Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 847.
50. Class, 806 F.3d at 239.
51. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12111(8), 12131(2).
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nature of the position; or (3) it is highly unlikely that the accommodation
would allow the disabled person to perform the position’s essential
functions or meet its essential eligibility requirements. 52 A position’s
functions and eligibility requirements are essential if they “bear more than
a marginal relationship to the [position].”53 Because both criteria are
broadly construed, courts have diverged when interpreting their meaning
and applying their interpretations to the adjudication of disputes. 54 An
examination of the grounds for the varying interpretations is necessary to
understand how the Fourth Circuit reached its flawed decision in Class v.
Towson.
a. Determining Whether a Position’s Function and/or Eligibility
Requirements Are “Essential”
In cases like Class v. Towson, where a disabled athlete sues for the
right to fully participate in an athletic program, the defendant frequently
rationalizes its exclusion decision by claiming that the athlete failed to pass
a physical examination “essential” to certifying eligibility.55 For example,
in Poole v. South Plainfield Board of Education, a New Jersey school
board cited a failed physical exam as justification for its decision to enforce
the exclusion of a disabled athlete from a local high school’s wrestling
team.56 However, the District Court for the District of New Jersey
disagreed and held that the athlete’s disability rights had been violated. 57
The court found that, despite only having one kidney, nothing suggested
that the disabled athlete was incapable of “pinning his adversary to the mat
or meeting training requirements.”58
52. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987).
53. Class, 806 F.3d at 246 (citations omitted); see PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 689
(2001).
54. See generally Pahulu v. Univ. of Kan., 897 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Kan. 1995); PGA Tour,
532 U.S. 661.
55. See generally Poole v. S. Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948 (D. N.J. 1980);
Wright v. Colum. Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 793 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Pahulu, 897 F. Supp. 1387;
Knapp, 101 F.3d 473 at 476–77.
56. Poole, 490 F. Supp. at 953.
57. Id. at 954.
58. Id. at 953.
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Instead, the record revealed that the high school excluded the disabled
wrestler because it feared the severity of an injury to his sole remaining
kidney.59 Acting on this fear, the school required the athlete to pass a
physical exam constructed so that the absence of a kidney was, in and of
itself, grounds for withholding a passing grade. 60 While the court was
sympathetic to the school’s safety concerns, it reminded the school board
that “[l]ife has risks. The purpose of [the Rehab Act], however, is to permit
handicapped individuals to live life as fully as they are able, without
paternalistic authorities deciding that certain activities are too risky for
them.” 61 To compete on the wrestling team, the disabled athlete only
needed to demonstrate the requisite level of skill and conditioning. 62 It was
not essential that he pass an arbitrary physical exam that did not measure
his ability to compete. 63
In PGA Tour v. Martin, the Supreme Court held that a disabled golfer
could ride in a cart during competition. 64 In so holding, the Court stated
that the Professional Golf Association’s (PGA) mandate to walk the golf
course was “not an essential attribute of the game [of golf] itself.”65 In a
seven-to-two decision, the majority agreed with the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals’ assertion that walking is incidental to golf, whereas “the essence
of [golf] has always been shotmaking.” 66 The Court reasoned that
although the walking rule may appear to affect shotmaking by introducing
an element of fatigue, expert medical opinion showed that any such effect
was negligible.67
59. Id. at 953.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 953–54.
62. See id. at 953.
63. See id. at 953–54.
64. PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 663–64.
65. Id. at 685; cf. Kuketz v. Petronelli, 821 N.E.2d 473, 479–80 (Mass. 2005) (illustrating
a rule that is integral to a sport’s composition and holding that a disabled racquetball player’s
request to allow two bounces before returning the ball was unreasonable because the essence of
racquetball was hitting a moving ball before the second bounce).
66. PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 683.
67. Id.
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Yet, despite the strong precedent set by Poole, Martin, and other such
cases,68 “two rogue court decisions” 69 stand as “outliers”70 in their
interpretation of what constitutes an essential function or an eligibility
requirement.71 In the first such case, Pahulu v. University of Kansas, the
District Court for the District of Kansas stated that it was “unwilling to
substitute its judgment” for that of the University of Kansas (KU). 72
Accordingly, it held that medical clearance by a team physician could
remain an essential eligibility requirement at KU. 73 In stark contrast to the
process employed by the court in Martin, the Chief Judge in Pahulu did not
evaluate medical evidence that questioned the merit of KU’s clearance
policy.74 Instead, the court disregarded the standard of scrutiny set forth in
Poole and determined that KU’s policy was rational and should therefore
be upheld despite its conservative guidelines. 75
Similarly, in Knapp v. Northwestern University, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed a district court decision granting Nicholas
Knapp an injunction against Northwestern University (NU) in his quest to
play college basketball despite suffering from a heart condition. 76 As in
Pahulu, the Seventh Circuit declined to examine whether NU’s medical
clearance policy was marginally related to determining whether Knapp
could fulfill the duties of an NU basketball player. 77 Instead, citing Pahulu,
68. See generally Wright, 520 F. Supp. 789; Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397
(1979); Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Why Can’t Johnny Read or Play? The Participation Rights of
Handicapped Student-Athletes, 1 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 163, 170–71 (1991).
69. Eldon L. Ham, Disabled Athletes:
A Last Vestige of Court Tolerated
Discrimination?, 8 SETON H ALL J. SPORT L. 741, 741 (1998).
70. See Eldon L. Ham, How 4th Circ. Failed to Clarify Athlete Disability Rights, LAW
360 (Jan. 3, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/738601/how-4th-circ-failed-toclarify-athlete-disability-rights [https://perma.cc/AE7W-YMXT].
71. See generally Mitten, supra note 42, at 194–204 (discussing eligibility requirements).
72. Pahulu, 897 F. Supp. at 1394.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. Knapp, 101 F.3d at 485.
77. Id. at 484–85.
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it held that because NU’s policy was rationally devised, NU’s
determination that Knapp’s failure to satisfy the university’s clearance
policy rendered him ineligible for competition should be given deference. 78
b. Determining Whether an Accommodation Is Reasonable
As stated earlier, an accommodation is reasonable unless: (1) it
would impose undue financial or administrative burdens on the program or
entity sponsoring the position sought; (2) its implementation would
fundamentally alter the nature of the position and/or sponsoring entity; or
(3) it is highly unlikely that the accommodation would allow the disabled
person to perform the position’s essential functions or meet its essential
eligibility requirements. 79
i.

Undue Financial or Administrative Burden

To determine whether an accommodation imposes undue financial or
administrative burdens on a sponsoring program or entity, courts must
consider: (1) the cost of the accommodation; (2) the overall financial
resources of the sponsor; (3) the overall manpower of the sponsor; and (4)
the impact of such accommodation on the sponsor’s general operation. 80
The onus is on the sponsor to prove that the proposed accommodation
would cause such an unacceptable encumbrance, and consistent with the
spirit of the ADA and the Rehab Act, it is very difficult for sponsors to do
so.81 For example, football programs have been unable to successfully
argue that testing diabetic players’ blood-sugar levels and administering
insulin shots during competition imposes a burden substantial enough to
render such accommodations unreasonable. 82

78. See id. at 485.
79. Sch. Bd., 480 U.S. at 287 n.17.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B).
81. See David Harger, Drawing the Line Between Reasonable Accommodation and Undue
Hardship Under the Americans With Disabilities Act: Reducing the Effect of Ambiguity on Small
Businesses, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 783, 785–90 (1993).
82. See generally Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 843.
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ii. Fundamental Alteration
An accommodation is also unreasonable if it forces a sponsor to
“lower or . . . effect substantial modifications [to its participation] standards
[related to the position sought].”83 The Supreme Court endorsed this
principle in Southeastern Community College v. Davis.84 There, a deaf
nursing school applicant claimed that Southeastern Community College
(SCC) violated the Rehab Act by refusing her proposed accommodation—
excusal from clinical courses. 85 In considering this case, the Supreme
Court found that SCC’s customary goal of teaching students how to
communicate with patients could only be achieved through clinical
learning.86 Moreover, implementation of an accommodation that devalued
a clinical curriculum would require SCC to significantly alter standards
central to its mission. 87
Therefore, the deaf applicant’s proposed
accommodation was unreasonable and SCC did not violate the Rehab Act
by refusing its implementation.88
On the other hand, in Martin, the Supreme Court held that requiring
the PGA to allow use of a golf cart did not compel the PGA to lower or
substantially modify its participation standards. 89 The Court reasoned that
“the use of carts is not itself inconsistent with the fundamental character of
the game of golf.” 90 According to the Court, “Congress intended that an
entity like the PGA . . . carefully weigh the purpose, as well as the letter, of
the [challenged] rule before determining that no accommodation would be
tolerable.”91 Unlike in Davis, where clinical learning was inextricably tied
to SCC’s standards and objectives, the “walking rule” in Martin was a mere
83. Wright, 520 F. Supp. at 793 (citing Se. Cmty. Coll., 442 U.S. at 413).
84. Se. Cmty. Coll., 442 U.S. at 413.
85. Id. at 401–02.
86. Id. at 409–10.
87. See id. at 413.
88. See id. at 413–14.
89. PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 683–85.
90. Id. at 683.
91. Id. at 691.
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formality unrelated to a golfer’s skill and not essential to the game’s
construction. 92
The decision-making process employed by the Court in Martin
echoed an approach previously adopted by the District Court for the Middle
District of Florida in Johnson v. Florida High School Activities.93 In that
case, the court sought to determine whether waiver of an age requirement
would fundamentally alter a high school football program. 94 The court
stated that “the relationship between the age requirement and its purposes
must be such that waiving the age requirement . . . would necessarily
undermine the purposes of the requirement.” 95 After resolving that the
requirement’s purpose was to protect player safety and promote fair
competition, the court considered the attributes of the waiver-seeking
player to determine whether allowing his participation would frustrate that
purpose.96
The court concluded that the player was neither physically imposing
nor exceptionally skilled, so his inclusion on the football team would
therefore not compromise player safety or fair competition. 97
Consequently, accommodating the player by waiving age restrictions was
reasonable and would not substantially modify the football program’s
participation standards. 98 The court’s message was clear: “if a rule can be
modified without doing violence to its essential purposes . . ., it [cannot] be
‘essential’ to the nature of the program or activity to refuse to modify the
rule.” 99
92. Id. at 683–85.
93. Johnson v. Fla. High Sch. Activities, 899 F. Supp. 579, 585 (M.D. Fla. 1995), vacated
as moot, 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 585–86; see also Ganden v. NCAA, No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WL 680000, at *15
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1996); Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 863 F. Supp. 483, 490
(E.D. Mich. 1994) (holding that waiving an age requirement was reasonable because the
requirement’s purpose, to ensure safety and promote fair competition, would not be compromised
since the petitioning athlete did not play a contact sport and was not exceptionally skilled).
99. Johnson, 899 F. Supp. at 585 (quoting Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities
Ass’n, 40 F.3d 926, 932–33 (8th Cir. 1994) (Arnold, R.S., dissenting)); see Weston, supra note
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Similarly, in Wright v. Columbia University, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that waiving Columbia University’s
(CU) medical clearance policy did not fundamentally alter the school’s
football program. 100 There, CU’s decision to exclude a disabled player was
held to violate the Rehab Act even though the player’s lack of sight in one
eye disqualified him under the university’s clearance policy. 101 Despite the
player’s disability, the court found him to be sufficiently talented and
decided that his inclusion on the football team would not require CU to
lower its participation standards. 102 Implicit in the court’s reasoning was
the idea that CU’s clearance policy was not paramount to preserving the
integrity of CU’s football program. 103 Consequently, the policy did not
trump the player’s disability rights. 104 In fact, as later held by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, the ADA and the Rehab Act preempt
inconsistent institutional bylaws when necessary to effectuate the Acts’
reasonable accommodation provisions. 105 Therefore, a university’s desire
to execute an internal policy does not excuse it from compliance with the
ADA and the Rehab Act when the two mandates conflict. 106
iii. Inadequate Accommodation
In cases like Class v. Towson, universities frequently argue that a
disabled athlete’s proposed accommodation is unreasonable because it
46, at 163 (“[S]porting organizations should be prepared to explain the purpose of their eligibility
requirements and rules of competition, to articulate the connection between the requirements and
purpose, and to evaluate on an individual basis whether modification of such rules can be made
without undermining this legitimate purpose or fundamentally altering the nature of the game.”).
100. Wright, 520 F. Supp. at 793–94.
101. Id. at 795; see also Shepherd, supra note 68, at 170–71 (noting cases wherein relief
was granted to visually impaired athletes barred from competition by their respective
universities).
102. Wright, 520 F. Supp. at 793.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. Mary Jo. C. v. N.Y. State & Local Retirement Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 163 (2d Cir.
2013).
106. Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 849; see Brief of Appellee at 15, Class v. Towson Univ.,
806 F.3d 236 (4th Cir. 2015) (No. 1:15-cv-01544-RDB).
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would not enable the athlete to meet essential eligibility requirements or
perform functions necessary for full participation in team activities. 107
Frequently, the crux of this argument is that the proposed accommodation
cannot eliminate direct threats to the disabled athlete’s safety.108
The ADA defines a “direct threat” as “a significant risk to the health
or safety of [a disabled athlete] that cannot be eliminated [or reduced] by
reasonable accommodation.” 109 Accordingly, a university does not violate
the ADA or the Rehab Act when its decision to exclude a disabled athlete
is based on an accurate conclusion that the athlete’s participation will
directly threaten the athlete’s safety. 110 However, federal regulations
regarding enforcement of the ADA and the Rehab Act state:
In determining whether an individual poses a direct threat to [his
or her] health or safety . . ., a public entity must make an
individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that
relies on current medical knowledge or on the best available
objective evidence, to ascertain: the nature, duration, and
severity of the risk; [and] the probability that the potential injury
will actually occur.111
In assessing the abovementioned factors, a university should consider
recommendations from medical experts who have direct knowledge of the
disabled athlete as well as the opinions of specialists who have expertise in
dealing with the athlete’s disability.112 Only after such a detailed inquiry is
107. See generally Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d 833; Wright, 520 F. Supp. 789; Knapp, 942 F.
Supp. 1191; Poole, 490 F. Supp. 948; Pahulu, 897 F. Supp. 1387.
108. See Pahulu, 897 F. Supp. at 1389; Class, 806 F.3d at 241–42; Knapp, 101 F.3d at
477–78.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3); see also 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(r) (2017); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) (holding that under the ADA, the direct threat defense applies to
the direct threat to others and to the individual him/herself).
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)–(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2).
111. 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(b) (2017) (emphasis added); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (“In
determining whether an individual would pose a direct threat, the factors to be considered
include: (1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) The
likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) The imminence of the potential harm”); see
also Chevron U.S.A., 536 U.S. at 86 (2002); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 622, 649 (1998).
112. Jonathan R. Mook, Circuit Courts Address Who Is “Qualified” under the ADA, 2016
LAB. & EMP. EMERGING ISSUES 7426 (May 12, 2016) (citing 29 C.F.R. App. § 1630.2(r)).
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conducted might an institution be justified in excluding an athlete under the
direct threat provision. 113 Furthermore, exclusion remains unlawful if this
inquiry reveals that risks posed by the disabled athlete’s participation are
speculative or remote. 114 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
clarified this point, stating: “Any [dis]qualification based on the risk of
future injury must be examined with special care if the Rehabilitation Act
[or the ADA] is not to be circumvented easily, since almost all handicapped
persons are at a greater risk . . . [of injury] . . . .”115 Thus, “an elevated risk
of injury, without more, is [in]sufficient to justify the refusal to hire an
otherwise qualified handicapped person.” 116
Alone, findings of elevated risk are insufficient to justify exclusion
because they do not satisfy the “likelihood of substantial harm” standard
mandated by the ADA and the Rehab Act. 117 That is not to say that such
findings will not compel a team physician to recommend exclusion or give
universities a rational basis for barring a disabled athlete from
competition.118 However, the ADA and the Rehab Act “require[] more
than merely a rational basis for discriminating against a handicapped
athlete.” 119 Renowned sports law attorney Eldon L. Ham best articulated
this concept as follows:

113. Peter M. Spingola, Knapp v. Northwestern University: The Seventh Circuit Slam
Dunks the Rights of the Disabled, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV 709, 720 (1998) (citing Chiari v. City of
League City, 920 F.2d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 1991)) (“An individual is not qualified . . . if there is a
genuine substantial risk that he or she could be injured or could injure others.”).
114. Id. (“[E]xclusion decisions based upon fears of remote or minimal medical risks
violate the letter and spirit of the Rehabilitation Act.”).
115. Bentivegna v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 622 (9th Cir. 1982).
116. Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985).
117. Ham, supra note 69, at 744 (citing Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F. Supp.
418, 425 (E.D. Pa. 1982)) (“Mere possibilities, even if the perceived harm could be substantial,
are not strong enough, for the statute, and the majority of evolving interpretations stick to the
literal requirement that such harm be ‘likely.’”).
118. See Matthew J. Mitten, Amateur Athletes with Handicaps or Physical Abnormalities:
Who Makes the Participation Decision?, 71 NEB. L. REV. 987, 1019 (1992).
119. Id. (first citing Jacobson v. Delta Airlines, 742 F.2d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied 471 U.S. 1062 (1985); then citing Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372,
1383 (10th Cir. 1981); and then citing Casey v. Lewis, 773 F. Supp. 1365, 1371 (D. Ariz. 1991)).
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[A team] physician’s careful opinion may . . . [be] sound
medically, but the physician’s job is not to interpret statutes.
The physician’s term “extremely high risk” is not the same as an
objective legal test which relies upon “likelihood.” For
example, if an individual hypothetically increases the already
remote chance of quadriplegia . . . by an incremental amount
[of] twenty-five percent by playing football, this may be too
much additional risk from a sound medical point of view.
However, from a legal . . . vantage, the resultant risk is still nil.
Therefore, although both medical and legal risks are
fundamentally sound for their own purposes, they are not the
same.120
Employing this line of reasoning, the court in Poole refused to
dismiss the disabled wrestler’s complaint despite the school having found
that participation in team activities posed a direct threat to the wrestler’s
safety.121 In so holding, the court listened to competing medical testimony
and concluded that the school had not adequately considered the best
available objective evidence—the opinion of medical experts with direct
knowledge of the wrestler’s disability. 122
Because those experts
determined that the risks posed by participation were grave but remote, 123 a
likelihood of substantial harm was not established, and his exclusion was
not justified under the ADA or the Rehab Act. 124
One year after Poole, the Wright court issued a similar verdict.
There, the court found the risk of harm to be minimal where a renowned
ophthalmologist testified that playing football did not increase the
likelihood of the visually impaired player suffering a significant eye
injury.125
Consequently, Columbia’s exclusion decision, although
“laudably evidencing [its] concern for its students,” ultimately served to
120. Ham, supra note 69, at 746.
121. See Poole, 490 F. Supp. at 954; see also Wright, 520 F. Supp. at 793 (citing
Suemnick v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No. 4-70592 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (oral decision)).
122. See Poole, 490 F. Supp. at 954.
123. See id. at 953.
124. See id. at 954.
125. Wright, 520 F. Supp. at 793.
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“derogate from the rights secured to plaintiff under [the Rehab Act].”126
The university attempted to protect the disabled athlete, but by disregarding
reliable medical evidence in favor of its own inexpert deliberations, it
achieved the opposite effect. 127
A third federal court case, Grube v. Bethlehem Area School District,
aligned with the opinions in Poole and Wright to form a triumvirate of
cases critiquing “direct threat defenses.”128 Encountering a fact pattern
almost identical to that in Poole, the court in Grube evaluated expert
medical testimony and found that the plaintiff, an athlete with only one
kidney, should be allowed to compete under the Rehab Act. 129 The court
reasoned that although the defendant’s fear of catastrophic injury was
subjectively reasonable, the weight of medical evidence exposed the risk of
such injury to be remote. 130 Moreover, the plaintiff made a well-reasoned
decision to compete, and endorsing his right to self-determination was in
keeping with the spirit of the Rehab Act. 131
Taken alone, however, the right to self-determination does not
prevent an exclusion decision rooted in objective medical evidence. 132 For
example, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
upheld a school’s decision to exclude a disabled football player where
doctors with direct knowledge of the player’s heart condition unanimously
agreed that it was too dangerous for him to compete. 133 The player’s talent,
emotional pleas, and citation of mitigating data were outweighed by the
doctors’ objective prognoses.134 Without any expert testimony challenging
126. Id. at 794.
127. See id.
128. See Mitten, supra note 118, at 1017–018; Grube, 550 F. Supp. 418.
129. Grube, 550 F. Supp. at 421–24.
130. Id. at 424, 425.
131. See id. at 422.
132. See Matthew J. Mitten, Sports Participation by “Handicapped” Athletes, 10 ENT. &
SPORTS L. 15, 20 (1992).
133. Mitten, supra note 118, at 1015 (citations omitted).
134. Id. at 1014–015 (citations omitted); Matthew J. Mitten, Enhanced Risk of Harm to
One’s Self as a Justification for Exclusion from Athletics, 8 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 189, 199–200
(1998) (citations omitted).
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these unfavorable medical assessments, the court was prudent in
concluding that allowing the athlete to compete would invite a high risk of
injury and substantial likelihood of significant harm. 135 Consequently, the
school’s exclusion decision did not violate the ADA or the Rehab Act. 136
IV.

ANALYSIS: CLASS V. TOWSON UNIVERSITY

In Class v. Towson University, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit improperly reversed the district court’s decision and upheld
Towson’s action to prohibit Class from competing as a member of the
university’s football team. 137 In so doing, the court incorrectly determined
that medical clearance by Towson’s physician, Dr. Kari Kindschi, was an
essential eligibility requirement. 138 It also misconstrued case law and
ignored relevant facts in finding Class’ proposed accommodation, the
CorTemp system, unreasonable. 139 Worst of all, by deferring to Kindschi’s
“subjective good-faith” judgment, the Fourth Circuit skirted its
responsibility to weigh medical evidence and determine whether the
university’s decision to exclude Class was “objectively reasonable.”140

135. Mitten, supra note 118, at 1015 (citations omitted); see also Mitten, supra note 134,
at 200.
136. Mitten, supra note 118, at 1015 (citations omitted); see also Mitten, supra note 134,
at 200.
137. See generally Class v. Towson Univ., 806 F.3d 236, 252–59 (4th Cir. 2015) (Wynn,
J., dissenting); Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 13, Class v.
Towson Univ., 806 F.3d 236 (No. 1:15-cv-01544-RDB); Eldon L. Ham, How 4th Circ. Failed to
Clarify Athlete Disability Rights, LAW 360 (Jan. 3, 2016, 9:00 AM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/738601/how-4th-circ-failed-to-clarify-athlete-disability-rights
[https://perma.cc/AE7W-YMXT].
138. Class, 806 F.3d at 253–54 (Wynn, J., dissenting); Appellee’s Petition for Panel
Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137, at 9–11; see Ham, supra note 137.
139. Class, 806 F.3d at 257–59 (Wynn, J., dissenting); Appellee’s Petition for Panel
Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137, at 9–11; see Ham, supra note 137.
140. Class, 806 F.3d at 255–56 (Wynn, J., dissenting); Appellee’s Petition for Panel
Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137, at 9–11; see Ham, supra note 137.
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A. Satisfaction of Towson’s Return-to-Play Policy and/or Medical
Clearance by Dr. Kindschi Was Not an Essential Eligibility
Requirement
By requiring Kindschi’s clearance for eligibility, the Fourth Circuit
implied that Towson had been sued over a non-controversial safety
precaution. 141 The court did not view Towson’s demand for in-house
medical clearance as discrimination in disguise. 142 Instead, it held that
Towson had the authority to determine that Kindschi’s approval was
necessary to certify eligibility for the football team. 143
The Fourth Circuit’s analysis was misguided. 144 Instead of quickly
washing its hands of the essential eligibility requirement issue, the Fourth
Circuit should have recognized that the facts in Class v. Towson mimicked
those in Poole. As discussed in section (B)(1)(a) of Part III, the Poole
court held that passing a school-administered physical exam was not
essential to participation on the school wrestling team because the exam
had nothing to do with the wrestler’s ability to compete.145
Like the exam in Poole, the requirement of Kindschi’s clearance set
an arbitrary standard based on the unfounded concern over future injury. 146
Even Judge Niemeyer, the author of the Fourth Circuit’s majority opinion,
conceded that this standard was simply “based on [Kindschi’s] feelings, not
on any medical or scientific evidence.”147 In order to be considered an
essential eligibility requirement under the ADA and the Rehab Act,
Kindschi’s clearance must have (1) set a tangible benchmark of
performance that (2) reflected directly on an athlete’s ability to compete at
141. Class, 806 F.3d at 246.
142. Id. at 248.
143. See id. at 247.
144. See generally id. at 252–59 (Wynn, J., dissenting); Appellee’s Petition for Panel
Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137; Ham, supra note 137.
145. Poole v. S. Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948, 953–54 (D. N.J. 1980).
146. See generally Class v. Towson Univ., 118 F. Supp. 3d 833, 842–43 (D. Md.), rev’d,
Class, 806 F.3d; Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137,
at 7; Ham, supra note 137.
147. Class, 806 F.3d at 247; see also Brief of Appellee at 15, Class v. Towson Univ., 806
F.3d 236 (4th Cir. 2015) (No. 1:15-cv-01544-RDB).
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the requisite level.148 Had the Fourth Circuit followed this directive, it
would have discovered that neither criterion was satisfied.
First, it is obvious that Kindschi’s clearance set no tangible
benchmark of performance. Kindschi extended clearance when she felt an
athlete was physically capable of performing; what lead her to that
“feeling” is unknown.149 Consequently, players like Gavin Class were
presumably unsure how they might demonstrate their readiness to compete.
The Fourth Circuit should have recognized this confusion and held that
requiring Kindschi’s clearance set an untenable standard, and thus could
not be upheld as an essential eligibility requirement.
Additionally, the requirement of Kindschi’s clearance failed the
second criterion because her clearance was not based on whether Class
could compete at a level on par with his teammates. To prove otherwise,
Kindschi would have to show that she refused to clear Class because, even
with the implementation of CorTemp, medical evidence suggested that
complications from his heatstroke rendered him unable to keep up with the
team. However, as mentioned previously, the record is devoid of such
evidence.150 Judge Wynn highlighted this point in his dissenting opinion:
“Dr. Kindschi did not point to any medical evidence supporting her
decision . . . .”151 In fact, “Towson offered no testimony from anyone with
expertise in heat stroke . . . [because] [Kindschi] was aware of no medical
research that supported her [decision to exclude Class from
competition].”152
The facts demonstrate that Class was capable of matching the skill
and intensity of his teammates. 153 For example, both Dr. Casa and Dr.
148. See Poole, 490 F. Supp. at 953.
149. See Class, 806 F.3d at 247.
150. See Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137,
at 6–8; see Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 841–43.
151. Class, 806 F.3d at 258 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
152. Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137, at 7;
see Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 841–43; Brief of Appellee, supra note 147, at 22–23 (“Towson . . .
has offered no legitimate, non-discriminatory reason not to follow the June 2015 [Korey Stringer
Institute] report’s recommendations (for which Towson paid), reflecting that Class aced a
rigorous testing regimen designed to mimic the physical intensity of a football linesman.”).
153. See generally Class, 806 F.3d at 252; Ham, supra note 137; ESPN Edit Operations,
Outside the Lines: Gavin Class, VIMEO (2015), https://vimeo.com/141587564
[http://perma.cc/N7TC-SLGV].
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Barth categorically confirmed that there was no medical reason why Class
should not be able to play football. 154 Moreover, Judge Wynn noted that
the Fourth Circuit’s majority opinion “ben[t] key aspects of the factual
record” and “mischaracterize[d] the results of heat-tolerance testing” to
support its holding in favor of Towson. 155 An impartial assessment of the
facts would have revealed that requiring Kindschi’s clearance set an
arbitrary standard unrelated to Class’ ability to run, block, or perform any
other function integral to competing on the same level as his teammates.
Simply put, obtaining Kindschi’s clearance was not an essential eligibility
requirement, and Towson’s insistence otherwise constituted the type of
paternalistic behavior outlawed by the Rehab Act and the ADA. 156
B.

Implementation of the CorTemp System Was a Reasonable
Accommodation

In determining whether implementation of the CorTemp System was
a reasonable accommodation, the Fourth Circuit correctly rejected
Towson’s claim that implementation would saddle the university with
undue financial or administrative burdens. 157
However, the court
subsequently erred when it found that CorTemp was nonetheless
unreasonable because its implementation would fundamentally alter
Towson’s football program without eliminating direct threats to Class’
safety.158
1. Implementation of the CorTemp System Would Not Have
Fundamentally Altered Towson’s Football Program
In analyzing the “fundamental alteration” issue, the Fourth Circuit
found that implementation of CorTemp was unreasonable because it would
change the nature of Towson football by “impinging on the . . . discretion”
of Dr. Kindschi and her staff. 159 This sanctification of Kindschi’s judgment
154. ESPN Edit Operations, supra note 153.
155. Class, 806 F.3d at 257 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
156. See id. at 256–57 (Wynn, J., dissenting); see also Ham, supra note 137.
157. Class, 806 F.3d at 248–49.
158. See id. at 257–58 (Wynn, J., dissenting); see also Ham, supra note 137.
159. Class, 806 F.3d at 252.
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was flawed in and of itself and will be fully addressed below. 160 For now,
it is sufficient to state that the Fourth Circuit’s finding incorrectly assumes
that challenging Kindschi’s discretion necessarily equates to forcing
Towson to substantially modify the standards of its football program. 161
The court erred in determining that preserving Kindschi’s medical
authority was a fundamental goal of Towson football. 162 Unlike in Davis,
where ordering a change in curriculum would have frustrated the nursing
school’s mission and substantially modified its standards, here undermining
Kindschi’s discretion would have had little effect on Towson’s football
team.163 The Fourth Circuit would have reached this conclusion by
following the precedent set forth in Johnson and Martin, where the purpose
of a program’s rule was examined to determine whether undermining that
rule would fundamentally alter the program’s nature.164 Had it followed
this approach, the court would have found that Towson’s rule—giving
Kindschi ultimate authority to clear athletes—was enacted to comply with
a NCAA regulation mandating that: a team “physician’s ethical and
professional imperative to care for the best interests of student-athletes
trumps other university concerns or motivations.” 165 The purpose of that
regulation was to take decision-making power away from coaches, whose
jobs made them more likely to sacrifice an injured player’s health if
rushing that player back to action might improve on-field results.166
In Class v. Towson, however, there was no evidence that this purpose
would be left unfulfilled if Kindschi was stripped of her final say regarding

160. See Timothy G. Church & James R. Neumeister, University Control of StudentAthletes with Disabilities Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act,
25 J. C. & U. L. 105, 174–75 (1998).
161. See Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137,
at 9–11.
162. Id.
163. Ham, supra note 137.
164. See id.
165. Class, 806 F.3d at 248–49; see also Church & Neumeister, supra note 160, at 173
(citing NCAA, 1997-98 NCAA D IVISION I MANUAL Const. art. 2.2.3 (1997)).
166. Eldon L. Ham, Disabled Athletes: A Last Vestige of Court Tolerated
Discrimination?, 8 SETON H ALL J. SPORT L. 741, 762 (1998); see Cathy J. Jones, College
Athletes: Illness or Injury and the Decision to Return to Play, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 113, 155 (1992).
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medical clearance. 167 Nothing in the record suggested that the coaching
staff intended to put Class back on the field prematurely. Moreover,
Kindschi’s judgment went against Class’ best interests, considering
heatstroke experts declared that Class was “physically able to return to [the
team],” and could “withstand the rigors of collegiate level football.”168 The
heatstroke experts’ certification that Class could safely return to
competition ensured compliance with NCAA mandates for the protection
of student-athletes. This compliance satisfied the underlying purpose of
Towson’s rule, which gave Kindschi the authority to clear athletes for
competition. Thus, there was no need to discount expert medical opinion
in favor of Kindschi’s speculative determinations.
Dr. Casa and his colleagues determined that allowing Class to play—
with the aid of CorTemp—would not have forced Towson to substantially
lower its standards for safe participation. 169 Hence, there was no risk that
the university’s football program would be fundamentally altered.
Recalling Martin, it is apparent that “[i]f an exemption from walking
doesn’t fundamentally alter professional golf, it is inconceivable that
CorTemp monitoring fundamentally alters [Towson] football.”170
Therefore, by upholding Kindschi’s decision, the Fourth Circuit did not
protect the integrity or constitution of Towson football, but instead violated
Class’ disability rights and robbed him of his ability to make an
inspirational comeback. 171
2. Implementation of the CorTemp System Would Have Eliminated the
Direct Threat to Gavin Class’ Safety
The Fourth Circuit twisted facts to fashion support for its finding that
implementation of CorTemp did not eliminate direct threats to Gavin
Class’ safety.172 Regrettably, the court subsequently relied on this finding
167. See generally Class, 806 F.3d 236; Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 848; Appellee’s
Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137, at 9–11.
168. See Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 848.
169. See Class, 806 F.3d at 258 (Wynn, J., dissenting); see also Class, 118 F. Supp. 3d at
848–49.
170. Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137, at
10.
171. See Ham, supra note 137.
172. See Class, 806 F.3d at 257–58 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
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to incorrectly conclude that implementation of CorTemp was
unreasonable.173 In doing so, it wrongfully validated Dr. Kindschi’s
conjecture and disregarded the evidentiary baseline for establishing a direct
threat:
objective medical evidence demonstrating a likelihood of
substantial harm.174
A grounded interpretation of the record would have revealed that
Class’ risk of repeat heatstroke was remote. 175 However, by misconstruing
facts, the Fourth Circuit made that risk appear imminent. 176 Three pages of
the court’s majority opinion were spent challenging the CorTemp
thermoregulation tests that Class underwent at the Korey Singer Institute. 177
The majority meticulously critiqued the testing conditions as well as
CorTemp’s monitoring capabilities. 178 It even digressed into a discussion
on human digestion and how an unpredictable digestive process might
affect the efficacy of CorTemp. 179 Ultimately, the court decided that
CorTemp “could not ensure Class would not suffer from another heatstroke
while playing,” 180 and thus “the heatstroke risk really ha[d] not been
demonstrably abated.”181 This analysis was colored by the court’s fear that
“Class may be at an increased risk of a reoccurrence of heat stroke as a
result of his original injury.”182

173. See Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137,
at 8–9.
174. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(b) (2017); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536
U.S. 73, 86 (2002).
175. See Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137,
at 6–9; see also Class, 806 F.3d at 257–58 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
176. See Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137,
at 6–8, 7 n.3; see also Class, 806 F.3d at 257–58 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
177. Class, 806 F.3d at 248–51.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 250.
180. Id. at 251.
181. Id. at 249.
182. Id.
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Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit’s extensive critique yielded the
wrong legal conclusion. 183 The court’s fatal flaw was that its discussion
about inadequate testing, unstable digestive processes, and increased risk of
repeat heatstroke was mere speculation. 184 Its assertion that CorTemp
could not eliminate direct threats to Class’ safety was not supported by the
best, most current medical evidence, as required by the ADA and the
Rehab Act.185 Moreover, while the court’s concerns were worth noting,
they did not suggest a likelihood of substantial harm. 186 Therefore, they did
not justify excluding Class from competition because, as discussed earlier,
“[a] mere elevation of risk, without more, is insufficient to find that a
disabled individual [faces a direct threat and therefore] is not ‘otherwise
qualified’ [to compete].”187
Had the Fourth Circuit followed the trail of objective medical
evidence, it likely would not have held in favor of Kindschi and Towson.
The record was rife with scientifically verifiable answers for every question
that the court contemplated. For example, the court was worried that
CorTemp would not alert trainers in time for them to remove Class from
competition should his body overheat. 188 However, Dr. Casa had already
addressed this concern by explaining that heatstroke cannot come on
suddenly since internal body temperature generally will not rise more than
one degree per ten minutes. 189 Consequently, if team trainers properly

183. See Ham, supra note 137; see also ESPN Edit Operations, supra note 153.
184. See Class, 806 F.3d at 258 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
185. 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(b); see also Chevron U.S.A., 536 U.S. at 86.
186. Ham, supra note 166, at 744 (citing Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F.
Supp. 418, 425 (E.D. Pa. 1982)) (“Mere possibilities, even if the perceived harm could be
substantial, are not strong enough, for the statute, and the majority of evolving interpretations
stick to the literal requirement that such harm be ‘likely.’”).
187. Peter M. Spingola, Knapp v. Northwestern University: The Seventh Circuit Slam
Dunks the Rights of the Disabled, 73 C HI.-KENT L. REV 709, 720 (1998) (paraphrasing Mantolete
v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985)).
188. Class, 806 F.3d at 251.
189. Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137, at 8;
Transcript of Record at 104–06., Class, 806 F.3d 236 (No. 1:15-cv-01544-RDB).
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monitored Class’ CorTemp readings, “it [would be] impossible for Class
even to approach the heatstroke ‘danger zone.’”190
Objective medical evidence proved overwhelmingly that “the
‘cascade of consequences’. . . feared [by the Fourth Circuit] could arise
only by ignoring [telltale] warning signs [and CorTemp alerts].”191 In fact,
“[i]f [Class] us[ed] the [CorTemp] system . . ., [he] would be the safest
person on the football field because he[] [would be] the one person who
then could not overheat during practice.”192 Although many of Dr. Casa’s
studies did not include people with a history of heatstroke, 193 the court
seemingly ignored the dispositive fact that “there [was] no evidence in the
record that anyone ha[d] ever suffered heatstroke while being monitored
with the CorTemp system, which is used by numerous universities and
NFL teams.”194 Had the Fourth Circuit resisted its paternalistic urge to
insulate Class, it would have accepted these facts and resolved that the
implementation of CorTemp eliminated any direct threat to Class’ safety.
Instead, the majority was paralyzed by fear and rendered a decision that
violated Class’ disability rights.
C. The Fourth Circuit Applied the Wrong Standards of Analysis in
Determining that Towson’s Decision to Exclude Class Was Reasonable
While the Fourth Circuit’s mischaracterization of the record is
inexcusable, it committed its most egregious error by determining that
courts need not adjudicate competing interpretations of medical evidence
when evaluating a university’s decision to exclude a disabled athlete. 195
The court stated:
[T]he standard for assessing Dr. Kindschi’s judgment not to
clear Class for return to football under Towson University’s

190. Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137, at 8
(citation omitted).
191. Id. (citation omitted).
192. Class, 806 F.3d at 258 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
193. See Transcript of Record, supra note 189, at 121.
194. Class, 806 F.3d at 258 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
195. See id. at 251.
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Return-to-Play Policy is not whether we share that judgment or
whether she had a better judgment than some other doctor.
Rather, the standard is whether her judgment was reasonable
. . . .196 And in resolving this question, we give the Team
Physician’s decision—and derivatively, Towson University’s
decision—a measure of deference. . . .197 Stated otherwise, in
evaluating reasonableness, we must determine whether the Team
Physician’s decision and, derivatively, Towson University’s
decision . . . was a good-faith application of its policy to protect
the health and safety of student-athletes.198
The court thus declared itself to be Kindschi’s defender: her
decisions were to be respected if they related to the goal of ensuring Class’
safety. Likewise, where Kindschi’s judgment reflected a good-faith
concern for Class’ welfare, it was to be shielded from the onslaught of
damning medical evidence. Under Knapp, so said the Fourth Circuit,
courts presiding over athlete disability cases were auditors of subjective
intent, not triers of fact. 199
However, this reasoning was an affront to the purpose of the ADA
and “the Rehabilitation Act: ‘to permit handicapped individuals to live life
as fully as they are able, without paternalistic authorities deciding that
certain activities are too risky for them.’”200 Far from recommending
deference to a university accused of violating an athlete’s disability rights,
the Acts demand that courts initiate a de novo review of the university’s
judgment in light of the best available objective medical evidence. 201 The
court must act as an unbiased fact-finder because:

196. Id.
197. Id. at 247 (citations omitted).
198. Id.
199. See Id. at 251.
200. Dana A. Rice, Seventh Circuit Misses Jumper: Fails to Protect Disabled Student
Athletes Knapp v. Northwestern University, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 84, 85
(2003) (quoting Poole, 490 F. Supp. at 953–54).
201. See Spingola, supra note 187, at 740–41 (“[T]he Supreme Court, as stated above, has
required courts to make an independent assessment as to the legitimacy of a [university’s]
concerns. The Arline court squarely placed the responsibility for making an individualized
inquiry, making findings of fact, and giving appropriate weight to the competing concerns of
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[D]eferring to one party’s [judgment] contradicts the intent of
the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ideal process of
justice, where parties argue and judges judge. If these Acts have
any teeth, a court, not the excluding party, must fairly determine
whether exclusion [of a disabled athlete] is warranted. 202 In
recognition of this, Congress specifically named colleges and
universities as possible violators of the ADA and Rehabilitation
Act.203 Therefore, Congress most likely did not intend courts to
defer to a college or university’s own judgment.204 Though it
may be difficult to adjudicate a battle between [competing
medical opinions], it simply is bad policy for a court to defer to
one party’s reasoning in a proceeding. . . .205
Rather,
determinations are to be made based on an objective view,
presumably one which would take into account views of both
parties.206
The presiding district court judge in Knapp appreciated these
principles:
I must consider the testimony of all experts who testified and
determine which are most persuasive. It is what the trial of
disputes such as this will sometimes require. It might have been
better to have left the choice to a panel of physicians, but
Congress left it with the courts.207

[universities] and disabled individuals on the courts, not on [universities] seeking to bar disabled
persons from participation in their services or programs.”).
202. Church & Neumeister, supra note 160, at 175 (emphasis added) (citing Martin v.
PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1247–48 (D. Or. 1998)).
203. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131(1)(B), 12181(7)(J) (1994)); 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(2)(A)
(1998)).
204. Id. (emphasis added).
205. Id. (citing Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 970 F. Supp. 1094, 1119–20
(S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
206. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B at 623 (1998)).
207. Knapp v. Nw. Univ., 942 F. Supp. 1191, 1197 (N.D. Ill.), rev’d, Knapp v. Nw.
Univ., 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996).
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However, when Knapp reached the Seventh Circuit, the bench
became infected by “an extraordinary ‘in loco parentis’ mindset” which
facilitated the court’s counterintuitive conclusion that defendants were
owed deference in disability rights cases. 208 Employing this faulty
reasoning, the Seventh Circuit refused to weigh competing medical
evidence and upheld NU’s decision to exclude Nicholas Knapp from
competition.209 Universities, said the court, are best situated to make
medical determinations regarding disabled athletes. 210 Should those
determinations be litigated, a court’s only job is to ensure that the accused
university was motivated by a concern for student-athlete welfare.211
Furthermore, because courts were in an inferior position to make medical
determinations, the judiciary need not concern itself with evidence
exposing universities’ concerns to be speculative or paternalistic. 212
This radically unsound thinking created a circuit split 213 by ignoring
the ADA and the Rehab Act’s mandate for substantive review of a
university’s decision to exclude a disabled athlete. 214 Moreover, by
inexplicably shielding Northwestern’s judgment from judicial scrutiny, the
Seventh Circuit “create[d] an irrebutable presumption” in favor of
universities accused of violating an athlete’s disability rights.215 Under
Knapp, courts could overturn a university’s exclusion decision only in the
exceedingly rare case where that decision was made in subjective bad

208. Ham, supra note 166, at 743.
209. Knapp, 101 F.3d at 484–85.
210. Id. at 484.
211. See id. at 484–85.
212. See id.
213. Regarding the “otherwise qualified” issue: the Seventh Circuit in Knapp, 101 F.3d
473, and the Fourth Circuit in Class, 806 F.3d 236, delivered holdings that conflicted with those
issued in Wood v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 437 (8th Cir. 1993) and Pushkin v. Regents of
Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981).
214. See Spingola, supra note 187, at 730; Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987).
215. See Spingola, supra note 187, at 730. See generally Brief of Appellee, supra note
147, at 45 (“Towson’s argument that Class is not otherwise qualified because the team doctor did
not clear him to play is a tautology.”).
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faith.216 Therefore, as a practical matter, athletes like Class could not win
in the Seventh Circuit. 217
Sadly, by following this bad precedent, the Fourth Circuit in Class v.
Towson discounted a large catalog of contrary case law218 and evaded its
congressionally imposed duty to objectively analyze evidence when
determining whether Towson’s decision to exclude Class was lawful. 219
The court should have conducted an impartial review of the record and
decided that the medical opinions of heatstroke experts were more
persuasive than Dr. Kindschi’s paternalistic presumptions. Instead, the
majority punted and delivered a deferring opinion that bound Class to the
will of Towson—the very entity accused of violating his rights.
V.

CONCLUSION

Congressional mandates set forth in the ADA and Rehab Act require
the legal community to reject the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Class v.
Towson. The majority opinion is clever, but polluted by the “Hank Gathers
Effect,” 220 a phenomenon where fear of catastrophic injury precipitates the
suppression of a disabled athlete’s rights.221 While this Comment does not

216. See Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 137,
at 12.
217. See generally id.
218. See generally Arline, 480 U.S. at 287; PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001);
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 622 (1998).
219. See Church & Neumeister, supra note 160, at 175.
220. Eldon L. Ham, How 4th Circ. Failed to Clarify Athlete Disability Rights, LAW 360
(Jan. 3, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/738601/how-4th-circ-failed-to-clarifyathlete-disability-rights [https://perma.cc/FEZ4-8SMJ].
221. See Ham, supra note 166 at 760–62 (1998) (suggesting that the highly publicized
incident where Loyola Marymount University basketball star Hank Gathers died on the court has
led to an undercurrent of paternalism in subsequent disability rights cases). Recalling Gathers’
untimely death and Loyola Marymount’s resulting public relations nightmare, universities have
improperly decided that violating the ADA and the Rehab Act is sometimes necessary to prevent
similar tragedy and protect the university’s reputation. However, these universities neglect to
consider that Gathers’ death was, in large part, caused by Loyola Marymount’s failure to adhere
to the initial prescribed dosage of Gathers’ medication (the accommodation)—which would have
allowed Gathers to safely compete despite his heart condition. Furthermore, to improve on-court
results, Loyola Marymount’s coaching staff had rushed Gathers back to competition despite
unmistakable evidence that his return was premature. See id.

PETERSON1_JCI_10-1_F INAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

Fourth Circuit Fumbles the Ball

1/22/2019 7:18 PM

291

suggest that the court should be condemned for attempting to ensure Class’
safety, it does ask the reader to evaluate the record and conclude that the
court’s concerns were not supported by substantial medical evidence.
Therefore, such concerns did not justify the Fourth Circuit’s delivery of an
opinion that spurned the ADA and the Rehab Act by implying that certain
activities were too risky for a disabled person.
The Fourth Circuit was consumed by thoughts of an improbable
development—that Class’ return would result in tragedy—a fascination
that ultimately led the court to fixate on a sliver of distorted precedent
despite overwhelmingly contradictory case law. 222 Had the court resisted
the emotional pull of this doomsday scenario, it would have held that Class
was “otherwise qualified” to compete. Instead, the court’s focus on fear
drove it away from the law and plunged it into a meandering rationalization
of its decision to abdicate authority in favor of Kindschi’s subjective
judgment.
Courts must learn from the Fourth Circuit’s mistakes if the integrity
of federal disability law is to be upheld. The sad result of Class v. Towson
should show courts that disabled athletes need protection, not from
themselves, but from paternalistic universities keen on disregarding the
ADA and the Rehab Act when compliance is inconvenient. Most
importantly, when evaluating a university’s exclusion decision, courts
should recall Class’ denied dream223 and demand that the decision be
supported by the best available objective medical evidence, not merely by
subjective guesswork.

222. The court should have considered that, because Class was willing to sign a liability
waiver, Towson would be insulated from legal consequences in the extremely unlikely event that
Class’ return resulted in catastrophic injury. Class’ waiver would be binding because he had equal
bargaining power and was sufficiently informed about the risks of returning to play. See Cathy J.
Jones, College Athletes: Illness or Injury and the Decision to Return to Play, 40 BUFF. L. REV.
113, 142–43, 210 (1992).
223. Despite being denied of his dreams to return to Division I football, Class—as a
testament to his character and physical well-being—is now a top competitor in the World
Transplant Games where he won five medals in 2016. See Gavin Class Overcomes Incredible
Odds and Returns to Competitive Athletics, CBS BALT. (June 30, 2016, 8:53 AM),
http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2016/06/30/former-towson-football-player-gavin-class-overcomesincredible-odds-and-returns-to-competitive-athletics [https://perma.cc/67TA-998T]; see also Jake
Lourim, Towson’s Gavin Class Recovers from End of Football Journey to Find ‘Enlightening’
Opportunity
at
Transplant
Games,
BALT.
S UN
(June
26,
2016),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/sports/outdoors/bs-sp-outdoors-gavin-class-transplant-games0626-20160624-story.html [http://archive.is/DpxTB].

